In the present paper, a complete process from reliability evaluation to design modification is proposed and also applied to a newly designed and manufactured Remotely Piloted Helicopter (RPH) by the authors. First of all, a description of all platform subsystems is presented. After that, function diagram and also product tree of the whole system is depicted for further analysis. Then, the reliability of all parts and components are calculated through standard methods. The procedure is followed by FMEA/FMECA execution and determination of critical components and failures. Then, the reliability of the whole platform is calculated using standard block diagrams. Finally, in order to improve the mission operational reliability of the considered RPH, some modifications are implemented to the platform including configuration and mechanisms design changes. Nomenclature C = criticality number d = possibility of failure detection FMEA = failure modes and effect analysis FMECA = failure modes, effects and criticality analysis MTBF = mean time between failures MTTF = mean time to failure n = severity of failure P = probability of failure pdf ( ) = probability density function PN = probability number of component failure R S (t) = reliability function RPH = remotely piloted helicopter T = lifetime of item (Fig. 2 ) UAV = unmanned aerial vehicle = failure rate
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I. Introduction
No machine or vehicle is safe to be used unless it has approved by required safety and reliability regulations. In addition, since any crash in aerial vehicles causes serious detriments, considering reliability aspects in aerial vehicles is so essential. Although there are formularized methods to calculate the reliability for most of the systems, advent of an organized and coherent procedure to evaluate the reliability of a Remotely Piloted Helicopter (RPH) will be so valuable. Considering the growing international competition to ensure the reliability and the level of quality of the industrial products, the need for developing methods to calculate the precise value of the reliability has been increased. This can be seen, specially, in aerial systems where a small error may damage the whole system and cause a catastrophe. This is more vital for unmanned systems which are developed to carry out missions autonomously where the mission cancellation is energy, time and money consuming. Therefore, safe and reliable operation has more importance in these vehicles. Besides, in recent years, there is a growth in use of unmanned aerial vehicles due to their lower cost comparing to manned aerial vehicles. However this lower cost is considerable when the reliability of unmanned systems is reasonable comparing to manned systems. In addition, the completion of a mission is the goal of any system and a small undesired event can affect the mission quality. Therefore, the reliability of aerial systems has considered in several studies. Indeed, the ability to perform reliable operations is an important parameter in the design, fabrication and presentation of any product.
Several studies on reliability and design quality of aerial vehicles are carried out recently. Some of them are based on theoretical formulation while the others present experimental results. On the other hand, some of these literatures considered the reliability analysis in general form, while the others deal with a case study. Stamatelatos presents the principal concepts of fault tree analysis and has emphasized on aerospace systems 1 . In this study, steps, tools and application of fault tree analysis have been described by useful examples. As another example, a complete study on reliability and availability of some current UAVs has been performed by Schaefer, based on flight operation data which investigates the reliability of the aircraft as the mission reliability and includes three military fixed wing UAVs operating in different environments 2 . Reference 3 presents general aspects of reliability growth management of an advanced light helicopter. This research has been performed during helicopter prototype development and contains reliability data analysis, modeling reliability growth, methodology and benefits of reliability management. In Ref. 4 the main rotor of Bell 214 helicopter has been modeled as a serial-parallel system and the failure distribution of all components has been determined based on given data. Then, reliability is calculated for different time periods including 2, 5 and 10 hours.
II. The Parvan Unmanned Helicopter Overview
Design, optimization and construction of an unmanned helicopter were parts of an academic project which has been performed by a group of graduate and undergraduate students in Amirkabir university of technology (Tehran Polytechnic).
The constructed helicopter, named Parvan, is a novel RPH which can lift up 2 kilograms payload and fly in 120 kilometers radius of action for about 1.5 hours 5 . The defined mission for this helicopter is traffic monitoring which can be a useful tool for traffic control. An operational life of 100 hrs is considered in the design.
The second prototype of this unmanned helicopter with a full composite structure has been developed after optimizations and reliability improvements to operate a full safe mission.
III. Reliability Concepts And Definitions
Reliability is the probability of desired system operation under a specified condition for determined time duration 6 . The present work is based on the traditional reliability theory. In the so called theory, the system or its components are only allowed to take two possibilities: either working or failed, but in a multistate system, both the system and its components have more than two possible states, e.g. completely working, partially working or partially failed, and completely failed. In fact, a multistate system reliability model provides more flexibility for modeling of equipment conditions but it is also expensive and more complicated 7 . Furthermore, there are some fundamental concepts defined in reliability studies such as Mean Time Between Failures (MTBF) which states how long a repairable component will execute without failure. Definite relationships are defined between the reliability and MTBF. For non-repairable components, Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) is used instead of MTBF. In addition, mission reliability for aerial vehicles is defined as 100 minus the percentage of times a mission is cancelled because of maintenance issues 2 . Given the reliability function R S (t) for a system, the mean time-to-failure, MTTF, can be calculated by integrating this function through time:
(1)
Besides, the failure rate of a system or component is the frequency of fails per hour or per determined hours. In analytical approach, the failure rate of a system can be obtained by dividing system probability density function,
, by the reliability function:
where system probability density function (pdf) is the time derivative of the reliability function 8 :
However after performing some corrections during initial tests and debugging the system, the failure rate for a given component tends to be constant until the component approaches the end of its life time. Therefore, failure rate can be considered without change during normal useful life time 9 .
Figure 2. Typical failure rate history diagram 9 With this assumption, in this paper failure rates are estimated through ground tests of the subsystems and the whole system as well, and initial flight tests of Parvan unmanned helicopter. Thus, with estimating MTBF or failure rate ( ), reliability (R) is formulated as follows: Indeed, for reliability determination, negative exponential distribution is used. Any system consists of several subsystems each of which includes different parts. While these components operate their own functions, the mission of the system will be performed through interactions of these components. Therefore, for reliability calculations, conventional systems can be separated to some serial and parallel components. For example, in the case of a system with two statistically independent components in series format of operation, the system's reliability equation is given by 10 :
Also, the reliability of a system including two parallel components is:
Schematic diagrams of parallel and serial systems are shown in Fig. 3 .
IV. Failure Analysis And Maintenance Procedures
A. Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA)
In early 1950s a new technique used in the design and development of flight control systems which were named failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA). Since then this method has received widespread acceptance in the industry and has been introduced very well:
"FMEA is used to evaluate the design, at the initial stages from reliability aspects. The procedures demand listing the potential failure modes of each and every component on paper and their effects on the listed subsystems. There are seven main steps involved in performing failure modes and effect analysis: (i) establishing system definition; (ii) establishing ground rules; (iii) describing system hardware; (iv) describing functional blocks; (v) identifying failure modes and their effects; (vi) compiling critical items; (vii) documenting" 7 . Indeed, the analysis of any potential failure state in a product or process which performed to determine failures effects is named Failure Mode Effect Analysis.
B. FMECA Tables And Maintenance Procedure
Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) is a procedure by which potential failure modes in a system are identified and analyzed 11 . In this procedure every parts and components of the system is revised separately to see the possibility of improper functioning. Each of these possibilities will lead to a chain of events which may cause system failure. Indeed, FMECA procedure studies the probability and criticality of these failures and identifies potential product weaknesses assuming a pessimistic viewpoint since the design procedure usually approaches from an optimistic viewpoint. Thus, FMECA procedure usually starts from almost the beginning of the product design to the final steps of the fabrication process. Since the objective of FMECA is to identify all modes of failure within a system design, its first purpose is the early identification of all catastrophic and critical failure possibilities, so they can be eliminated or minimized through design corrections at the earliest possible time. Although FMECA is a great tool of reliability study, it can be used for other purposes. The use of this analysis can be seen in maintainability, safety analysis, survivability and vulnerability, failure detection and isolation subsystem design 10 .
In the present work an FMECA table has been developed to find the most critical failure modes and hence, the most critical group of components on the recently designed and fabricated unmanned helicopter (Parvan). Since in a helicopter system there are many complicated and coupled interactions between components, the whole system in this case study is divided into several subsystems to observe which part of the system is the most critical one. The criticality number (C) for each subsystem is attained by finding the average of the criticality numbers of its components. Every component that its calculated criticality number is more than a predefined norm number, should be revised and redesigned to meet the desired value which is achieved experimentally. Thus, in the present work, reliability of the most critical subsystem is studied in detail and calculated precisely. The analysis and results are presented in the next chapters of the paper. The criticality number of each part is calculated using: ,
where PN is the probability number of component failure, n is the severity of that failure and d is the possibility of its detection. In the present study, these numbers are assumed to vary from 1 to 3 with respect to the component specifications, operation and role. One can see that the possible minimum and maximum value for C will be 1 and 27 respectively. A norm of 12 is considered for criticality number, hence components with criticality numbers larger than this norm, have been revised and redesigned to meet this norm and ensure safe operation. Table 1 shows a sample of FMECA table and the results of analysis for estimating severity, detection and probability numbers based on experimental data. In this table, P is the probability of the failure. 
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Maintenance policy can be driven from two different viewpoints: 1) corrective; 2) preventive 12 . According to this fact, as it's shown in Table 1 , some preventive procedures are included in FMECA for Parvan RPH. The column "preventive and recovery precautions" of FMECA table is used to determine some maintenance issues. These precautions include three actions, a) Scheduled preflight checks: check of servos, fan casing, pinion, gear, main shaft, control links, structure screws, tail swash plate, etc (before every flight) and main shaft lock, bearings, mechanism screws, pulley and tail belt, etc (every 10 hrs), b) Replacement of distorted parts: clutch strip, main shaft bearing, c) Some alarm gauges for undesirable conditions: low battery and governor alarm, engine temperature sensor. For example, in avionics subsystem, some components such as connectors, batteries and regulator should be checked in specified periods of time in order to ensure safe operation. The predetermined preventive procedures have reduced failure probability and criticality of the components effectively.
C. Product Tree And Function Diagram
After fitting design, producing and configuring all components, product tree was provided to show level and relations of components and subsystems. Concerning the complex system of a helicopter, for providing a detailed product tree, Parvan unmanned helicopter is divided into 8 distinct groups from the assembly viewpoint. Therefore, each group can be assembled separately to montage the whole vehicle. Indeed, product tree is a guide for assembling groups and could be used for preparation of maintenance procedures and checking tables. One can see assembly groups in Fig. 4 all together and product tree of engine group as the first assembly subsystem in Fig. 5 .
Product tree is a static presentation of the system, while the function diagram shows components and subsystem relations to demonstrate any defined flight modes. Furthermore, different levels of errors can be investigated through these diagrams. 
Parvan
V. Reliability Calculations
A. Determination Of Subsystem's Criticality
In order to have a good estimation for the reliability of the Parvan helicopter, detailed calculations has been performed for most critical subsystems. Thus, the criticality number for subsystems should be determined by taking the average of component criticality numbers of considered subsystem. For example, the criticality number of the avionics subsystem which contains 8 components is:
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Position is changed. For reliability analysis, the 8 groups defined as assembly groups have been reduced to 6 subsystems. Therefore, flybar and hub are named as "control" subsystem and also power train 1 and power train 2 groups are named as "gear box" subsystem. Criticality numbers for all these subsystems are given in Table 2 . It can be seen that the control group is the most critical subsystem.
B. Reliability Calculations For Helicopter Subsystems
In order to calculate the reliability for whole system, firstly the helicopter modeled as a system with only serial components and reliability determined by negative exponential distribution. In this step, the initial failure rates from FMEA before taking additional considerations and redesign to reduce the failure rate were used and then total failure rate ( ) considering all components was obtained. This initial amount is 0.246. Therefore system reliability for 2 hours mission duration is calculated as follows:
According to complexity of performing all the changes that have been achieved from additional considerations of the system redesign, in the present study, only the control subsystem which is introduced as the most critical one, considered as a sample, to calculate the reliability before and after considering redesign changes.
C. The Reliability Of Control Subsystem
Control subsystem is modeled as a set of serial-parallel components. The two main parts of these subsystem are flybar and hub. For more exact reliability calculation of control subsystem, components relations are determined as demonstrated in detailed diagrams of Fig. 7 and Fig. 9 . 
Figure 7. Hub block diagram
Since the two main parts of the control subsystem are serial, the reliability of this subsystem are given by,
The reliability calculations for these parts (hub and flybar) are presented separately in the following sections. Fig. 7 , it can be seen that hub center is in serial form with two independent parts, i.e. blade related components and mechanisms. Therefore, the reliability of hub is: (11) In table 3, gross and revised failure rates are presented for hub. The reliability of hub is calculated using these failure rates. It should be noted that the more accurate failure rate of components given in the right column of the table, is calculated using equations presented in Ref. 13 . Regarding to components relations, blade related components and so called mechanisms reliability can be obtained as follows:
(12) (13) Substituting these values into Eq. 12, we have:
In this step, gross estimate of failure rates are considered.
Reliability calculations for flybar
Dividing flybar block diagram to two parts a and b, and assuming failure rate of 0.002 for all flybar joints, the reliability is calculated in the same manner:
Where And Thus, Finally, using Eq. 11 the reliability of control subsystem will be:
Considering design requirements, it seems that this is not a proper value of reliability for the most critical subsystem of the Parvan Helicopter. Therefore, to improve system reliability, a set of design and fabrication changes should be performed. Some of those changes have been made in the present work, such as: -More depth threads -Replacing uncertain parts with proper components -Reducing temporary joints Applying these changes and using precise failure rates which are given in Table. 3 once more, the reliability of the control subsystem is obtained equal to 0.959 which is a reasonable value.
VI. Conclusion Remarks
For an unmanned helicopter as a dynamic and multidisciplinary system, the reliability plays an important role in its operation success. First of all in the present study, based on FMECA procedure, failure modes, failure rates and criticality number were obtained for all components and subsystems of the considered unmanned helicopter (Parvan). In addition, in order to compare subsystems criticality, average criticality number is introduced and it was found that the control subsystem has the most average criticality number. Then, the more detailed reliability calculations were performed for control subsystem and it is observed that initial reliability value of the subsystem is 0.887. Finally, to improve the considered reliability, the components have been analyzed and some changes were applied in the design and fabrication manner. Indeed, using more precise connections, simplifying some mechanisms and increasing check time intervals are three most important changes.
Furthermore, containing main elements of the helicopter, function diagram shows the relationships of different subsystems and fault propagation flow. Thus, according to this diagram, some redundancy and precautions could be added to have safer mission operation. Finally, in order to obtain a more precise value of reliability, some experimental tests can be performed on critical components and more accurate data for failure rates of these components might be achieved.
